August 29, 2005 (concl.)

Katrina's final death toll was over 1800, by far the worst for a U.S. hurricane in recent history. As mentioned, most deaths occurred in New Orleans, and most were due to the failure of the levees. The levees have since been strengthened, many of the flooded areas have been rebuilt, and evacuation plans for those without transportation have been beefed up. Some of the devastated areas were never rebuilt, however, and many residents have permanently moved away.

Weather forecasts for Katrina were generally quite good, at least in the last couple of days prior to landfall. Dissemination of warnings was also effective; very few did not know that a major hurricane was coming. The problem, again, is that many residents were unable to heed the warnings and leave the area, which is the only foolproof way to survive a storm like Katrina. An analogy might be the Jarrell, TX F5 tornado of May 1997. The only reliable way to survive an F5 tornado is to go to a basement or other below-ground location, but many residents didn't have basements. This, sadly, contributed to the high death toll. In both this tornado and Katrina, many took the best option that they could (Jarrell residents went to the lowest level of their houses), but it wasn't good enough. Meteorologists are primarily concerned with ensuring that warnings are timely and accurate, and also that they are properly disseminated; the ability of residents to heed these warnings is not part of their area of expertise. It is, however, obviously of critical importance, so perhaps weather forecasters need to be more aware of it. Once a storm is actually approaching, it is of course too late to do much.

I was in New Orleans in January 2008, almost 2 1/2 years after Katrina. Although the water had obviously long since receded, I could still see many abandoned, flooded-out homes on the way from the airport to the hotel. There were opportunities advertised (I was at an American Meteorological Society conference) for touring some of these areas and helping with rebuilding. I didn't end up participating, for better or worse. (I was there only a few days and didn't have much free time, but I also must admit that it would have been a physically and emotionally dificult task.) I will be back in New Orleans for another AMS conference this January (2012); perhaps there will be other opportunities then.

The name Katrina has since been retired, as the names of all sufficiently devastating hurricanes are. (My namesake, Andrew, was retired in 1992.) Katrina has now been replaced by the similarly-named Katia (only two letters difference), which ironically is forecast to become a major storm in the Atlantic this week. Also ironically, another storm is forming in the Gulf of Mexico and looks destined to threaten New Orleans, but its name will be Lee. (And of course there is the recently departed Irene, which, although not remotely a disaster on the scale of Katrina, inflicted its share of destruction and misery.) Lee also does not look to become a storm of Katrina's intensity, but it could still be bad enough. Let's hope that it isn't.

August 29, 2005 (cont.)

...give or take a year. (See previous post.)

Most people know about the horrific aftermath of Katrina, when needed assistance took days to arrive. Both federal and local governments were inexplicably slow to respond, resulting in miserable conditions among the survivors, and many preventable deaths. Media coverage was often sensational and innaccurate, with false reports of murders and rapes; the fact that many of Katrina's victims were black made it easy for some people to believe the worst about them.

The failure of the levee system, which led to most of the deaths in New Orleans, was forseeable. Years before Katrina (as early as 1986), design flaws in many of the levees had been pointed out. (For example, soil strength had been overestimated in their construction.) Projects to upgrade the levees were underway, but still only 60-90% completed by 2005. The fact that a major hurricane had never directly struck New Orleans was undoubtedly a factor in the slow renovation.

Poor coordination between the city, state, and Federal governments was another problem. In some instances, local officials waited to receive authorization from the Federal government, which never came. New Orleans mayor Ray Nagin also came under criticism; school buses were available to evacuate those without cars, but ended up not being used. Outside aid from a variety of sources waited uselessly, in some cases for days, again for Federal authorization. Inexperienced leadership at FEMA (Federal Emergency Management Agency) contributed greatly to the botched response. For example, FEMA head Michael Brown was unaware of conditions in the Superdome, or even that residents were sheltered there at all, until informed by CNN. Race and class (again, many victims were black and poor) also likely factored into the inadequate response.

To be concluded tomorrow (I promise!)